Justice: Plato to Rawls, Nozick and Sen
Theories of justice for UGC NET: Plato, Aristotle, utilitarianism, Rawls's two principles, Nozick's entitlement theory, communitarians, Sen and feminists.
- 15 min
On this page · 17 sections
- Prerequisites
- The Hook: A Book That Revived a Discipline
- 1. Classical Ideas of Justice
- 2. Utilitarianism
- 3. John Rawls: Justice as Fairness
- 4. Robert Nozick: Entitlement Theory
- 5. Communitarian Critique
- 6. Marxist Views of Justice
- 7. Amartya Sen: The Idea of Justice (2009)
- 8. Feminist and Other Critiques
- Memory Tricks
- Don’t Confuse
- Common Mistakes
- Practice
- Quick Revision Table
- Key Takeaways
- What’s Next
Prerequisites
- Liberty and Equality — theories of justice are, at bottom, arguments about how to combine these two values.
- The chapter overview for how the unit is asked.
The Hook: A Book That Revived a Discipline
How UGC NET asks it: Rawls’s concepts (original position, veil of ignorance, maximin, difference principle, lexical priority, reflective equilibrium, overlapping consensus) as match-the-following; Nozick’s three principles; Sen’s niti and nyaya; communitarian authors and their books.
1. Classical Ideas of Justice
Plato: Republic
| Speaker | View of justice | Plato’s (Socrates’) reply |
|---|---|---|
| Cephalus | Telling the truth and paying one’s debts | Returning a weapon to a friend who has gone mad cannot be just |
| Polemarchus | Giving each his due: helping friends, harming enemies | A just man harms no one |
| Thrasymachus | “Justice is the interest of the stronger” | Rulers, as rulers, aim at the good of the ruled, as a doctor at the patient’s |
| Glaucon | Justice is a compromise people accept from weakness (Ring of Gyges) | Justice is good in itself and for its consequences |
Plato’s own answer: justice is each part doing its own work and not meddling with the work of others. In the soul: reason rules, spirit supports, appetite obeys. In the city: philosopher-rulers (guardians), auxiliaries and producers each keep to their function. Justice is thus a harmony or functional specialisation, not a rule of distribution.
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book V
- Distributive justice: shares of honour, wealth and office distributed in proportion to merit (geometric proportion); equals treated equally, unequals unequally.
- Corrective (rectificatory) justice: in transactions, restore the balance disturbed by a wrong (arithmetic proportion), regardless of who the parties are.
- Justice as the complete virtue in relation to others; equity corrects the law where its generality makes it fail.
Other pre-modern and early modern markers
- Cicero / Roman law (Ulpian): justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due (suum cuique).
- Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40): the circumstances of justice are moderate scarcity and limited generosity; justice is an artificial virtue. Rawls borrows this idea.
- Hobbes: no justice in the state of nature; justice is keeping covenants made under a sovereign.
2. Utilitarianism
| Thinker | Work (year) | Key point |
|---|---|---|
| Jeremy Bentham | An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) | “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure”; the greatest happiness of the greatest number; felicific (hedonic) calculus; quantity of pleasure only (“pushpin is as good as poetry”, in substance) |
| J.S. Mill | Utilitarianism (1861, as magazine essays; book 1863) | Qualitative distinction of pleasures: better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied; justice is the most important part of utility |
| Henry Sidgwick | The Methods of Ethics (1874) | Systematic, impartial utilitarianism |
Rawls’s central objection: utilitarianism “does not take seriously the distinction between persons”. It adds up satisfactions across people as if society were one person, so it can justify sacrificing a minority for a larger total.
3. John Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Works (exact years matter)
| Work | Year | What it adds |
|---|---|---|
| “Justice as Fairness” (article) | 1958 | First sketch |
| A Theory of Justice | 1971 (revised ed. 1999) | Original position, two principles |
| “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” | 1985 | Reframes theory as political |
| Political Liberalism | 1993 | Reasonable pluralism, overlapping consensus, public reason |
| The Law of Peoples | 1999 | Extension to international society: liberal and “decent” peoples, duty of assistance |
| Justice as Fairness: A Restatement | 2001 | Final restatement |
The method
- Social contract tradition (Locke, Rousseau, Kant) made abstract: the contract is a thought experiment, not a historical event.
- Original position: representative parties choose principles for the basic structure of society (major institutions that distribute rights and duties).
- Veil of ignorance: the parties do not know their class, social status, natural talents, intelligence, strength, conception of the good or psychological traits, or even which generation they belong to. This makes the choice fair, hence “justice as fairness”.
- The parties are mutually disinterested and rational; they choose under uncertainty using the maximin rule: pick the option whose worst outcome is the best.
- Primary goods: things any rational person wants whatever else they want: rights and liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (the most important).
- Reflective equilibrium: principles and considered judgements are adjusted against each other until they fit.
The two principles
First principle (equal liberty): each person has an equal right to the most extensive (later: a fully adequate) scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for all.
Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
- (a) Fair equality of opportunity: attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
- (b) Difference principle: to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
Lexical (serial) priority: Principle 1 > Principle 2(a) > Principle 2(b). Basic liberties cannot be traded for economic gains. Basic liberties include political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of the person and the right to hold personal property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest.
Natural talents are, for Rawls, morally arbitrary, like being born rich: no one deserves them. The difference principle treats the distribution of talents as a common asset. This is the point Nozick attacks.
Political Liberalism (1993): the turn
- Modern democracies are marked by reasonable pluralism: citizens hold conflicting but reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious, moral, philosophical).
- Justice as fairness should be a political conception, not a comprehensive one, so it can be the object of an overlapping consensus among these doctrines, not a mere modus vivendi.
- Public reason: on constitutional essentials, citizens should argue in terms others can reasonably accept.
4. Robert Nozick: Entitlement Theory
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is the libertarian reply.
- Minimal (night-watchman) state: limited to protection against force, theft and fraud, and enforcement of contracts. Any more extensive state violates rights. The book begins from the claim that individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them.
- Entitlement theory has three principles:
- Justice in acquisition — how unowned things may be appropriated (subject to a Lockean proviso: others must not be made worse off);
- Justice in transfer — voluntary exchange, gift;
- Rectification of injustice — correcting past violations of 1 and 2.
- A distribution is just if it arose from a just one by just steps: justice is historical, not end-state (like utilitarianism) or patterned (like “to each according to need” or Rawls’s difference principle).
- Wilt Chamberlain example: start from any distribution you favour; fans voluntarily pay to watch Chamberlain play; he becomes rich. To restore the pattern you must interfere with free choices. “Liberty upsets patterns.”
- Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour.
- Self-ownership: people own themselves and their talents; Rawls’s “common asset” view fails to take seriously the distinction between persons — the same charge Rawls laid against utilitarianism.
- Part III, “Utopia”: the minimal state as a framework for utopias, where people form voluntary communities.
5. Communitarian Critique
| Thinker | Work (year) | Key criticism of liberal justice |
|---|---|---|
| Michael Sandel | Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) | Rawls assumes an “unencumbered self”, prior to its ends; real selves are constituted by community attachments. Justice is not the “first virtue” everywhere (e.g. families) |
| Alasdair MacIntyre | After Virtue (1981); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) | Modern moral language is fragments of a lost Aristotelian tradition; justice is intelligible only within a tradition and its virtues |
| Michael Walzer | Spheres of Justice (1983) | Goods have social meanings; each sphere (money, office, security and welfare, education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, political power…) has its own distributive principle; complex equality |
| Charles Taylor | “Atomism” (1979); Sources of the Self (1989) | Liberal atomism forgets that individual capacities develop only in society; the self is “dialogical” |
Communitarians ask whether the right is prior to the good (Rawls says yes; communitarians say the good comes first, because our identities come from shared goods). Rawls’s Political Liberalism answered partly by limiting his claim to the political domain.
6. Marxist Views of Justice
- Marx avoided appealing to “justice” in Capital; justice is part of the superstructure and reflects the mode of production. Exploitation (appropriation of surplus value) is “just” by capitalist standards of exchange.
- Yet in Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) Marx sketched two phases of communism: in the first, distribution according to work (contribution); in the higher phase, “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!”
- Analytical Marxists (G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, 1995) took up Nozick’s self-ownership argument directly and argued that egalitarians must reject it.
7. Amartya Sen: The Idea of Justice (2009)
- Transcendental institutionalism (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, Nozick) tries to identify perfectly just institutions.
- Realisation-focused comparison (Adam Smith, Condorcet, Bentham, Mill, Marx, Wollstonecraft) asks how to remove manifest injustice and compares actual states of affairs. Sen prefers this: in his example, to choose between a Picasso and a Dalí we gain nothing by identifying the ideal painting in the world.
- Sanskrit terms: niti (organisational propriety, rules, institutions) vs nyaya (realised justice, how people’s lives actually go). Sen warns against matsyanyaya — “justice in the world of fish”, where a big fish freely devours a small one.
- Capability approach as the informational basis; open impartiality via Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, including voices from outside the society, rather than Rawls’s closed original position.
- Parable of three children and a flute: Anne (only one who can play it), Bob (poorest, has no toys), Carla (made it). Each claim corresponds to a different theory — utilitarian, egalitarian, libertarian — showing that plural impartial reasons can coexist.
Martha Nussbaum developed a list of ten central human capabilities (Women and Human Development, 2000; Frontiers of Justice, 2006) and applied it to disability, nationality and species membership, three “frontiers” social contract theory cannot reach.
8. Feminist and Other Critiques
| Thinker | Work (year) | Point |
|---|---|---|
| Susan Moller Okin | Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) | The family, a school of justice, is itself unjust; Rawls must apply the principles inside the family |
| Carol Gilligan | In a Different Voice (1982) | An ethic of care alongside the ethic of justice |
| Iris Marion Young | Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) | Injustice is oppression and domination, not just maldistribution; “five faces of oppression”: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence |
| Nancy Fraser | “From Redistribution to Recognition?” (1995); Redistribution or Recognition? with Axel Honneth (2003) | Justice has two (later three) dimensions: redistribution, recognition and (later) representation |
| Brian Barry | Justice as Impartiality (1995) | Impartialist, Scanlon-style reasonable rejection |
Memory Tricks
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| Original position — the choice situation | vs | Veil of ignorance — the information restriction within it |
| Overlapping consensus (Political Liberalism, 1993) | vs | Modus vivendi — a mere balance of power, which Rawls rejects |
| Fair equality of opportunity — 2(a) | vs | Difference principle — 2(b) |
| Niti — rules and institutions | vs | Nyaya — realised justice |
| Historical principle (Nozick) | vs | End-state / patterned principle (utilitarianism, Rawls) |
| Sandel — Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) | vs | Okin — Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) |
| Aristotle’s distributive justice — merit, geometric | vs | Corrective justice — restore balance, arithmetic |
Common Mistakes
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in the UGC NET format. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- Which rule of choice under uncertainty do Rawls’s parties use in the original position?
- Name Nozick’s three principles of justice in holdings.
- In Plato’s Republic, who defines justice as the interest of the stronger?
Answers
- Maximin (maximise the minimum).
- Justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, rectification of injustice.
- Thrasymachus.
Level 2: Exam-style MCQs
Q1. (Practice) Which of the following is not among Rawls’s primary goods?
- (a) Rights and liberties
- (b) Income and wealth
- (c) The social bases of self-respect
- (d) Natural talents such as intelligence
Answer and explanation
(d). Intelligence and other natural talents are natural goods, not social primary goods distributed by the basic structure. Rawls treats their distribution as morally arbitrary.
Q2. (Practice) The concept of the “unencumbered self” was used to criticise Rawls by:
- (a) Alasdair MacIntyre
- (b) Michael Sandel
- (c) Robert Nozick
- (d) Brian Barry
Answer and explanation
(b) Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
Q3. (Practice) Consider the following statements about Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice:
- It criticises “transcendental institutionalism”.
- It uses nyaya to refer to realised justice in people’s lives.
- It rejects all comparative assessment of justice in favour of identifying perfectly just institutions.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 2 and 3 only
- (c) 1 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
(a) 1 and 2 only. Statement 3 reverses Sen’s position: he favours comparative, realisation-focused assessment over the search for perfect institutions.
Q4. (Practice) Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example is meant to show that:
- (a) natural talents should be treated as a common asset
- (b) maintaining any patterned distribution requires continual interference with liberty
- (c) utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons
- (d) the minimal state cannot protect property rights
Answer and explanation
(b). “Liberty upsets patterns”: voluntary transfers from any just starting point will disturb the pattern. (a) is Rawls’s view, which Nozick attacks.
Level 3: Assertion–reason, match and sequence
For assertion–reason questions, use these options:
- (a) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
- (b) Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
- (c) A is true, but R is false
- (d) A is false, but R is true
Q1. (Practice) Assertion (A): Rawls argues that the parties in the original position would reject utilitarianism. Reason (R): Behind the veil of ignorance, the parties know which social class they belong to.
Answer and explanation
(c). A is true: since the parties could be among those sacrificed for the greater total, they choose the principles that protect the worst-off. R is false: the veil hides their class position.
Q2. (Practice) Assertion (A): Nozick describes his theory of justice as historical. Reason (R): For Nozick, whether a distribution is just depends on how it came about, not on its structure at a given moment.
Answer and explanation
(a). R is exactly what “historical” means in Nozick’s usage.
Q3. (Practice) Match List I (Work) with List II (Author).
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. After Virtue | I. Michael Walzer |
| B. Spheres of Justice | II. Alasdair MacIntyre |
| C. Justice, Gender, and the Family | III. Iris Marion Young |
| D. Justice and the Politics of Difference | IV. Susan Moller Okin |
- (a) A-II, B-I, C-IV, D-III
- (b) A-I, B-II, C-IV, D-III
- (c) A-II, B-I, C-III, D-IV
- (d) A-II, B-IV, C-I, D-III
Answer and explanation
(a) A-II, B-I, C-IV, D-III.
Q4. (Practice) Arrange the following works of John Rawls in chronological order:
- Political Liberalism
- A Theory of Justice
- Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
- The Law of Peoples
- (a) 2, 1, 4, 3
- (b) 2, 4, 1, 3
- (c) 1, 2, 4, 3
- (d) 2, 1, 3, 4
Answer and explanation
(a). 1971 → 1993 → 1999 → 2001.
Quick Revision Table
| Thinker | Work | Year | Key idea |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plato | Republic | — | Justice = each doing own function; Thrasymachus refuted |
| Aristotle | Nicomachean Ethics V | — | Distributive (merit) and corrective justice |
| Bentham | Principles of Morals and Legislation | 1789 | Greatest happiness; felicific calculus |
| Mill | Utilitarianism | 1861/1863 | Higher and lower pleasures |
| Marx | Critique of the Gotha Programme | 1875 | “From each according to ability, to each according to needs” |
| Rawls | A Theory of Justice | 1971 | Original position, veil, two principles, maximin |
| Nozick | Anarchy, State, and Utopia | 1974 | Entitlement; minimal state; Wilt Chamberlain |
| MacIntyre | After Virtue | 1981 | Tradition-based virtue |
| Sandel | Liberalism and the Limits of Justice | 1982 | Unencumbered self |
| Walzer | Spheres of Justice | 1983 | Complex equality |
| Okin | Justice, Gender, and the Family | 1989 | Justice in the family |
| Young | Justice and the Politics of Difference | 1990 | Five faces of oppression |
| Rawls | Political Liberalism | 1993 | Overlapping consensus, public reason |
| Rawls | The Law of Peoples | 1999 | Liberal and decent peoples |
| Nussbaum | Frontiers of Justice | 2006 | Capabilities; three frontiers |
| Sen | The Idea of Justice | 2009 | Niti vs nyaya; comparative approach |
Key Takeaways
What’s Next
- Rights and Citizenship — rights as trumps (Dworkin) and Marshall’s three stages of citizenship
- Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism and Marxism — the traditions behind Rawls, Nozick and their critics
- Feminism, Ecologism, Multiculturalism and Postmodernism — Okin, Young and the politics of recognition
- Political Theory — Quick Revision