Business Economics Short Notes
One-page UGC NET Commerce revision for Business Economics: theories of the firm, elasticity, utility and IC analysis, cost curves, markets and pricing.
- 7 min
On this page · 8 sections
Every formula, name, curve and trap from Unit 3 on one page. For explanations and worked examples, go back to the chapter.
1. Meaning, Scope and Objectives
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| Business (managerial) economics | Economic theory + quantitative methods for decision-making and forward planning |
| Definitions | Spencer and Siegelman; Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (1951) |
| Nature | Micro, normative/prescriptive, pragmatic, future-oriented, interdisciplinary; uses macro as environment |
| Scope | Operational: demand, production, cost, pricing, profit, capital; environmental: economy, policy, trade |
| Principles | Opportunity cost, incremental (ΔR > ΔC), marginal, equi-marginal, time, discounting, risk |
| Profit maximisation | MR = MC and MC cuts MR from below |
| Critics | Berle and Means (1932): ownership vs control; Hall and Hitch (1939): full-cost pricing |
| Baumol (1959) | Sales revenue max s.t. minimum profit; more output, lower price, more advertising |
| Marris (1964) | Balanced growth \( g_D = g_C \) s.t. job security (valuation ratio, takeover) |
| Williamson (1964) | Managerial utility \( U(S, M, I_D) \): staff, emoluments, discretionary investment; minimum profit |
| Simon (1955) | Satisficing, bounded rationality, aspiration level |
| Cyert and March (1963) | Coalition; five goals: production, inventory, sales, market share, profit |
| Wealth maximisation | Maximise PV of the firm; allows for time and risk |
2. Demand and Elasticity
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| Movement vs shift | Own price → movement (extension/contraction); other factors → shift (increase/decrease) |
| Law of demand | Marshall; inverse P–Q relation, ceteris paribus |
| Why downward slope | DMU, substitution effect, income effect, new buyers, multiple uses |
| Giffen | Inferior staple; negative income effect > substitution effect; curve slopes up |
| Veblen | Conspicuous consumption, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) |
| Price elasticity | \( e_p = (\Delta Q/\Delta P)(P/Q) \); 0, < 1, 1, > 1, ∞ |
| Unit elastic everywhere | Rectangular hyperbola |
| Total outlay | P and spending opposite → elastic; same → inelastic; no change → unitary |
| Point method | Lower ÷ upper segment; mid-point = 1; price axis = ∞; quantity axis = 0 |
| Arc method | \( \dfrac{\Delta Q}{\Delta P} \times \dfrac{P_1 + P_2}{Q_1 + Q_2} \) |
| Determinants | Substitutes, necessity/luxury, income share, uses, time (LR more elastic), habit |
| Income elasticity | > 1 luxury; 0–1 necessity; < 0 inferior; Engel’s law (1857) |
| Cross elasticity | + substitutes; − complements; 0 unrelated |
| AR | = price = the demand curve |
| Linear MR | Same intercept, twice the slope of AR |
| AR–MR | \( MR = AR(e - 1)/e \); \( e = AR/(AR - MR) \) |
| e and TR | e > 1: MR > 0, TR rising; e = 1: MR = 0, TR max; e < 1: MR < 0 |
| Monopolist | Always on the elastic part of demand |
3. Consumer Behaviour
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| Cardinal | Utility measurable; Marshall; MU of money constant |
| Law of DMU | Gossen’s first law; TU max where MU = 0 |
| Equi-marginal | Gossen’s second law; \( MU_x/P_x = MU_y/P_y = MU_m \) |
| One-good equilibrium | MU = P (in money) |
| Consumer surplus | Willing to pay − paid; Dupuit, Marshall; area under demand above price |
| Ordinal | Edgeworth (1881), Pareto, Slutsky (1915), Hicks and Allen (1934), Hicks Value and Capital (1939) |
| MRS | \( -\Delta Y/\Delta X = MU_x/MU_y \); diminishing → convex IC |
| IC properties | Downward, convex, never intersect, higher = better, need not be parallel |
| Special ICs | Perfect substitutes: straight line; perfect complements: L-shaped |
| Budget line | \( P_xX + P_yY = M \); slope \( -P_x/P_y \); income → parallel shift; one price → rotation |
| Equilibrium | \( MRS_{xy} = P_x/P_y \) + IC convex |
| ICC / PCC | Engel curve / demand curve |
| Price effect | Substitution + income; Hicks: same IC; Slutsky: original bundle affordable |
| Normal / inferior / Giffen | Income effect same direction / opposite, weaker / opposite, stronger |
| Giffen paradox | Explained only by the ordinal approach |
| Revealed preference | Samuelson (1938) |
4. Production and Cost
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| Short run / long run | One factor fixed / all variable |
| AP–MP | MP = AP at max AP; TP max at MP = 0; MP peaks before AP |
| Three stages | I: to max AP; II: to MP = 0 (rational); III: MP < 0 |
| Isoquant | Equal output; \( MRTS = MP_L/MP_K \); convex |
| Least cost | \( MP_L/w = MP_K/r \); isocost tangent to isoquant; expansion path |
| Returns to scale | All inputs × k → output > k (IRS), = k (CRS), < k (DRS) |
| Cobb–Douglas (1928) | \( Q = AL^\alpha K^\beta \); \( \alpha + \beta \) vs 1; CRS → Euler’s theorem; elasticity of substitution = 1 |
| Economies of scale | Internal (firm: technical, managerial, marketing, financial, risk) vs external (industry) — Marshall |
| Economic cost | Explicit + implicit (incl. normal profit) |
| TFC / AFC | Horizontal / rectangular hyperbola, always falling |
| AVC, ATC, MC | U-shaped (variable proportions); MC min → AVC min → ATC min |
| MC rule | Cuts AVC and ATC at their minima, from below |
| ATC − AVC | = AFC; gap narrows |
| LAC | Envelope / planning curve (Viner, 1931); U-shape from returns to scale |
| Tangency | Falling LAC: left of SAC min; rising: right; only optimum plant at min |
| LMC | Cuts LAC at LAC’s minimum |
| Modern LAC | L-shaped; minimum efficient scale |
5. Market Structures
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| All markets | MR = MC (MC cutting from below); price from AR |
| Perfect competition | P = AR = MR; SR supply = MC above min AVC; shut down below min AVC |
| PC long run | P = MC = min LAC; normal profit; efficient |
| Monopoly | P > MR = MC; elastic range; no supply curve; deadweight loss |
| Lerner index (1934) | \( (P - MC)/P = 1/e \) |
| Pigou (1920) | 1st degree (each buyer’s max), 2nd (by quantity), 3rd (by market) |
| Discrimination conditions | Monopoly power; separable markets, no resale; different elasticities |
| 3rd degree | \( MR_1 = MR_2 = MC \); higher price in less elastic market |
| Dumping | International price discrimination |
| Chamberlin (1933) | Monopolistic competition; differentiation; selling costs; product group |
| MC long run | AR tangent to LAC on its falling part; normal profit; excess capacity |
| Joan Robinson (1933) | The Economics of Imperfect Competition; price discrimination |
| Oligopoly | Few sellers; interdependence; price rigidity |
| Models | Cournot 1838 (output), Bertrand 1883 (price), Stackelberg 1934 (leader–follower), Sweezy 1939 (kink) |
| Kinked demand | Cuts matched, rises ignored; MR gap; rigid price; does not explain how price was set |
| Price leadership | Dominant firm (size), low-cost firm (cost), barometric (market judgement); tacit collusion |
| Dominant-firm model | Residual demand = market − fringe supply; leader sets MR = MC on it |
| Cartel | Explicit collusion; unstable (incentive to cheat) |
6. Pricing Strategies
| Strategy | Price path | Suits |
|---|---|---|
| Skimming | High → lowered in steps | Inelastic early demand, innovation, patents, recover R&D, limited capacity |
| Penetration | Low at entry | Elastic demand, economies of scale, threat of entry, mass market |
| Peak-load | High at peak, low off-peak | Non-storable output, fixed capacity, time-varying demand (power, transport, telecom) |
| Peak-load rule | Peak = operating + capacity cost; off-peak = operating cost | |
| Cost-plus | AC + mark-up | Hall and Hitch’s finding |
| Going-rate | Match competitors | Oligopoly |
7. Traps in One List
Where to Go Next
- Business Economics: chapter overview
- Meaning, Scope and Objectives of Business Firms
- Market Structures and Pricing
- Accounting and Auditing: Quick Revision: the cost-accounting side of the same ideas
- Commerce overview